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ABSTRACT 
In order to improve ship self-defense against sea-skimming missiles, several concepts, 
such as the free electron laser, high-power microwaves, and the Phalanx gun system are 
reviewed and evaluated in this thesis. Phalanx computer simulations show that Phalanx is an 
inadequate means of protection. High-power microwaves are found to damage electronics, 
but calculations show limitations due to diffraction and the possibility of shielding. This 
thesis evaluates several damage mechanisms caused by the free electron laser's ultra-short 
picosecond pulse. Theories and experiments predicting the laser damage from short 
picosecond pulses are revie~ed and applied to the fel weapon design. It is found that there 
may be a significant advantage to the ultra-short pulse format of an FEL weapon; as a result, 
new experiments are 'planned. As MW FELs are not yet a reality, this thesis uses computer 
simulations to explore FEL operation for many values of the electron pulse length, peak 
current and cavity desynchronisni in order to explain recent Thomas Jefferson National 
Accelerator Facility (TJNAF) experimental observations of high average power. 
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F or the greater part of the past four decades, our military has been concerned with 
an adversary of equal military prowess, a military that could and would stand toe to toe 
with our military. Therefore, in the past, the conflict simulations used most often for the 
purposes of determining our military readines~ consisted of two countries massing their 
forces to overwhelm each other. The designs of our current warships were derived from 
the results of these simulations and existing technologies. Most of the weapon systems 
onboard USN warships today, were designed to fight an equal or greater force upon the 
open ocean. 
However, the world is not a static system, but it is rather a continuously changing 
system of requirements and demands. As the world changes, traditional methodology 
may not work for many situations that can arise. An example is the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The Cold War is now over and the chances that our military will encounter an 
equal military in the near future are slim at best. Even so, we can not concentrate our 
efforts entirely on threats from smaller Third World countries. China is modernizing its 
already highly capable military and future United States-China relations may deteriorate 
,and again threaten large-scale naval conflicts. 
Some lesser-developed countries have sought to gain equal footing in the world's 
hierarchy via military means. Many Third W orId countries now possess capable 
weapons systems that include chemical, biological, nuclear and high-tech components. 
Changing world requirements and the need for a strong flexible military has 
forced the Navy to re-address its role. Rather than fighting in the open ocean, the Navy's 
role is now primarily supporting troops ashore by operating in the littoral region alone 
with little or no support, or possibly in conjunction with foreign militaries. 
Ideally therefore, the navy needs ships that are capable of successfully engaging 
the enemy asea and ashore, while still being able to defend themselves from any attack. 
In practice however, it has been shown that although our modern warships are capable of 
attack they lack adequate defense against modern anti-ship missiles, which are now 
possessed by several Third World countries. A couple of illustrative examples are the 
sinking of the HMS Sheffield, and the "near sinking of the USS Stark by the low-flying, 
sea-skimming Exocet missile. As anti-ship missiles are become cheaper, smarter, longer 
in range and proliferate into the Third World, better defensive weapons are needed. 
This thesis concentrates on methods of ship air defense. A simulation shows that 
the Navy's Close-In-Weapon-System (CIWS) allows sea-skimming missiles to approach 
within a few hundred meters of the ship causing significant debris to hit the ship. High-
power microwaves are evaluated as a means of destroying the missile dectronics, but are 
found to be limited due to the diffraction of long wavelength radiation. Several damage 
mechanisms caused by the free electron laser (FEL) are evaluated. The ultra-short, high 
peak power laser pulses from the FEL are shown to not cause vapor blowoff or spalling, 
but do decrease the damage threshold fluence. Experiments and theory indicate that the 
ultra-short FEL pulses may increase damage by as much as a factor of 10. Finally, 
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simulations of the Jefferson Lab FEL describe recent experimental results of high average 
power. 
B. PASSIVE MEANS OF PROTECTION 
For a ship to be successful against an anti-ship missile, it must render the inbound 
missile ineffective, which can be done by physically destroying or impairing the missile, 
blinding its sensors, or attacking the missile's internal electronics. Blinding a missile's 
sensors can be done by attacking the missile's sensors or deceiving the sensors. The 
Navy currently has well established programs for the research and development of 
deception devices. It is not the purpose of this paper to delve into those methods other 
than to mention them briefly for completeness. 
1. Decoys 
Decoys are systems that can be deployed away from the object to be protected. In 
the case of ship protection, the decoys emulate the ship in some manner that would 
confuse an inbound weapon. They can be passive, like CHAFF, or active," giving off RF 
or thermal signals that are intended to confuse the inbound missile. These systems are 
generally very cheap and work well in combination with other ship defense systems. 
2. Camouflage 
Camouflage is a means of disguising an object to make it more difficult to detect. 
The Navy has hidden ships with the use of different paint schemes and colors to make 
visual identification more difficult. When anti-ship missiles use RF seekers rather than 
visual or electro-optical seekers, the ships are no longer hidden. Therefore, the Navy has 
aggressively pursued concepts that will reduce the radar cross section for new ships. This 
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includes investigations into the use of radar absorbent materials (RAM) and stealth 
technology to reduce a ships radar signature. Stealth technology and RAM are very 
promising solutions that are being implemented in the design of new ships as well as on 
existing ships. This solution might be effective against current and near future anti-ship 
missile and ship detection methods. However, RAM is only effective against RF, with 
new advancements in missile seeker technology, including impulse radar and 
hyperspectral imaging, RAM will become an ineffective means for camouflage. 
3. DoctrinelTactics 
The last means of passive ship defense is the use of training and tactics. By 
assessing scenarios that a ship may encounter, a list oflimitations for ship safety can be . 
produced. By accepting these limitations, a set of tactics can be constructed that would 
prevent a ship from encountering the scenarios that would endanger the ship 
unnecessarily. For example, it has been shown that the Navy standard missile is very 
effective against long-range, non-maneuvering, anti-ship missiles. Therefore, a doctrine 
can be established that keeps all enemy missile launchers at a safe distance. This is a 
cheap, effective means of protection, provided the limitations do not prevent mission 
accomplishment. Unfortunately, current Navy missions require ships to operate within 
the littoral region, which allows the possibility of having launchers inside of the 
minimum acceptable range. 
c. ACTIVE MEANS OF PROTECTION 
The other methods of anti-ship missile defense focus on attacking the missile. A 
system achieves a "kill" by successfully defeating a threat missile. These missile "kills" 
4 
can be further broken down into two categories, hard kill and soft kill. The preferred 
method of stopping an inbound missile is to achieve a hard kill: large-scale physical 
destruction, normally associated with physically destroying the missile. A less desirable 
but still a valid method of destruction is soft kill where mission-critical components are 
disabled while the target body remains largely undamaged. This is usually the result of 
blinding the sensors by attacking the internal electronics [1]. There are currently two 
basic methods of achieving kills on incoming missiles, they are kinetic energy and 
directed energy weapons. 
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II. KINETIC ENERGY WEAPONS APPROACH 
A. CLOSE-IN-WEAPON-SYSTEM (CIWS) 
The kinetic energy approach of destroy an incoming missile is normally thought 
to be a hard kill mechanism. The idea is to hit the incoming missile with a physical 
object and thereby destroy the inbound missile: The Close-in-Weapon-System (CIWS) 
aboard most surface ships was designed to achieve a hard kill by striking the incoming 
missile with multiple penetrators, with the goal of detonating the missile. The main 
advantages of the CIWS are 1) small size and low weight, 2) tested and in production? 
and 3) cheapest solution. However being a mechanical system, using explosive 
cartridges to propel the shells, the CIWS is prone to vibrational inaccuracies. In addition 
to these inaccuracies, the CIWS ha.s a limited effective range of approximately two 
kilometers. Therefore, the CIWS may destroy the missile at such a close range, that large 
pieces of the missile may still have enough momentum to reach the ship and cause 
serious damage. The final disadvantage to be pointed out is the limited magazine of the 
CIWS. 
For comparison in ship defense systems, the effectiveness CIWS in striking and 
subsequently destroying an inbound missile before impact was investigated via computer 
simulations. The first step was to calculate, as shown in Figure (1), the probability of 
hitting the missile vs. the missile range. Given the effective range of the CIWS, this plot 
was started at a missile range of 2000 m. It can be clearly seen, with this simulation of 
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the phalanx gun system, that a missile is likely to get close to the ship before being struck 
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Figure I. Probability of Hitting Inbound Missile vs. Range 
The next simulation in the determination of the CIWS' effectiveness in destroying 
an incoming missile was the cumulative hits vs. missile range, see Figure (2). For this 
simulation, it was assumed that the missile did not maneuver and traveled at only 400 
m/s. Combing the data from Figure (2) with the assumption that it takes 10 hits to 
destroy a missile, the kill range can be calculated. The typical kill range was determined 
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to be 100-200 meters from the ship [2]. Therefore, the phalanx is capable of destroying a 
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Figure 2. Cumulative Hits Incurred vs. Range 
2000 
Given these initial results, a further investigation was necessary to determine how 
effective this system was at protecting the ship, not just destroying the missile. This 
required a simulation dealing with fragment continuation after the missile was destroyed 
by CIWS. The desired result of this simulation was to determine if any fragments would 
hit the ship and if so what was the probability. Given the momentum of the missile 
debris, the size of the ship and the range to the ship, it was assumed that there was a very 
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large cross section for debris hitting the ship. The simulation took into consideration the 
fact that fragments vary in size, shape, and masses. Figure (3) represents the data 
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Figure 3. Possible Fragment Trajectories from Inbound Missile 
The last and most important part of the CIWS simulations was determining the 
actual probability of a missile fragment striking the ship. Several thousand random 
fragments were simulated at ranges from 100-2000m at increments of 100m. The results 
ofthis are reproduced for the reader in Figure (4). It can be seen that the closer to the 
ship that the missile is destroyed, the more likely its fragments are to hit the ship. These 
10 
,---------------------------
results were expected and it was bad news for those aboard ships. The probability of a 
fragment striking-the ship goes up rapidly as the range decreases. Unfortunately, the 
results from previous simulations show that the typical destruction range for an incoming 
missile is 170-190m. For an example, if you assume 200m and 10 fragments then four to 
five fragments will strike the ship. It was also noted that these fragments were not small 
chips of paint but rather sizable chunks of metal; the average fragment size was 40 kg, 
with a final average kinetic energy of2kJ. 
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Figure 4. Probability of Fragment Striking Ship vs. Destruction Range 
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B. ANTI-MISSILE MISSILES 
Another kinetic energy strategy being investigated is the antimissile missile. 
Missile technology is very mature, and the engineering is well developed, so it appears to 
be a logical approach to kill a missile with a missile. We have been using the theory of 
long-range detection and engagement with a missile. This method has been a solid 
solution for a number of years and the military is currently in the process of upgrading 
their systems. Given a sufficient detection range, the Navy's standard missile is quite 
capable. Nevertheless, with the improvement of anti-ship missiles there are many 
inherent problems for the missile-on-missile approach. An example of these inherent 
problems is the Theater High~Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program, which to date 
has not had a successful engagement in tests thus far [3]. The dynamics are proving to be 
much harder than antiCipated. A convenient rule of thumb is that defensive missiles must 
have t~ee times the maneuverability of the incoming missile [4]. Anti-ship missiles are . 
approaching the ability to fly at speeds over Mach 2, pulling greater than 109's in 
terminal maneuvers. Therefore, we are quickly approaching the point where defensive 
missiles will be required to pu1l30g's to adequately counter the maneuver's ofthe 
inbound missile. It can be reasonably assumed that shortly after any advances in 
defensive missile technology are made, the technology will be transferred to offensive 
missiles. Therefore, the new defensive missile will soon be outdated, and thus 
ineffective. Additionally, the cost of these missiles also rises as the new technology is 
employed. This higher cost makes it very expensive to conduct training, given budget 
limits. Lastly, like the CIWS, a small missile magazine is also a limitation. It is 
12 
becoming clear, from the two examples discussed, that kinetic energy weapons cannot 
provide the protection required in the future. 
13 
III. DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPON APPROACH 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since kinetic energy weapons are not a viable solution for the long term, we must 
tum to the investigation of the directed energy weapon (DEW). The Department of 
Defense has shown an interest in DEW since at least the mid-1970s, when it put together 
its first airborne laser under the program called Airborne Laser Laboratory [5]. Two 
areas of directed energy weapons are currently being funded by the military: Lasers and 
High Powered Microwaves (HPM). Whereas kinetic energy weapons have been 
employed for centuries and are quite well understood, directed energy weapons represent 
the future and their kill mechanisms are not that well understood. DEWs are normally 
thought to be soft-kill weapons, though the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser 
(MIRACL) "successfully engaged BQM-34s and supersonic TalosNandal missiles in 
crossing scenarios at tactically meaningful ranges" [6j. The two systems that will be 
described here have their own merits and pitfalls. Currently, lasers are thought of 
primarily as defensive weapons whereas the HPM are thought to be more along the line 
of offensive weapons. However, they share a common improvement over kinetic energy 
weapons; they strike at the speed of light. This feature is becoming increasingly 
important as anti-ship missile technology becomes more advanced. 
We have seen that CIWS has problems in effectiveness against straight flying 
missiles and the THAAD program is having problems striking the target. If a defensive 
weapon can travel at the speed of light, incoming missiles maneuverability becomes a 
15 
non-factor and faster response times are achievable. So a closer look at these two 
emerging technologies is warranted. 
B. HIGH POWERED MICROWAVES (HPM) 
1. Background 
It has been shown that HPM has the potential of being a threat to electronic 
systems [7]. Additionally, unless a system has been specifically tested and hardened 
against microwave energy, the system will have essentially no protection. A simple 
experiment shows the effectiveness of microwaves against electronics. Put a simple 
operating electronic wristwatch into a home microwave oven. Fbr this thesis, a digital 
watch was placed in a microwave oven. The watch suffered no noticeable effects after a 
one-second exposure, but after a three-second exposure, the watch had ceased 
functioning. There were no visible marks, the watch did not get hot to the touch, but it 
was inoperable. As the world becomes more reliant on sophisticated electronic weapons, 
the use of HPM as a weapon appears more enticing. 
Microwaves were first artificially generated in the 1880s by Hertz. Since then 
. several advances have been made in the microwave field, including th~ klystron in the 
thirties and the magnetron during World War II. The magnetron is probably the best 
example of a wartime scientific breakthrough that altered the course of a war. The 
British, under continual air attack from Germany, were in need of a system that would 
provide early warning that an attack was eminent, thereby allow them to prepare. The 
solution to their problem was the invention of radar. The magnetron, a microwave 
source, was the essential element of the radar system. It was a wartime development so 
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its deployment was faster than it would have normally been. As with most new 
technologies that are very different from the norm, it takes time before it is universally 
accepted. Today radar is an in~aluable tool that has been integrated into the heart of 
warfare. 
Recently the sources for HPM have taken large strides forward, in being able to 
provide large relativistic electron beams in excess of a gigawatt and with the 
miniaturization of the sources. So in the 1980s, HPM weapons received another look and 
the field has enjoyed a renewed vigor [8]. Microwave technology itself is very mature, 
although coupling it with today's sources is new evolving field. Figure (5)~ taken from 
"An Introduction to High Power Microwaves" by James Benford, depicts the emergence 
of HPM as a historical trend. 
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Figure 5. The history of high-power microwaves 
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When talking about the use of high power microwaves as a weapon, it is 
convenient to talk in terms of power density. The power density on the target from a 
microwave signal transmitted from a fixed-size antenna is proportional to a quality factor, 
pf2. This can be derived from relating the power density on the target with the energy 
flux on the target using the diffraction limit. Figure (6), taken from "An Introduction to 
High Power Microwaves" by James Benford, shows the general history of the 
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Figure 6. The growth of microwave devices in terms of quality factor pf2 
Two types of attack modes against electronics have been proposed. In one, an 
HPM fires an intense pulse to disable a specific target at substantial range. In the second 
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HPM attack mode, large areas are swept with a radiating pulse in hopes of disabling a 
significant number of targets [9]. Since the second mode of attack has debatable 
effectiveness against military targets, we will concentrate on the first mode of attack, 
which is more suitable for military applications. 
2. Source Selection 
In can be seen from the quality factor, pf2, that if we want to maximize the power 
density on the target then we must start with a viable source. Such a source would 
provide an output power that exceeded 1 GW. Figure (7), taken from High-Power 
Microwave Systems and Effects by Clayborne Taylor, is a comparison of peak power and 
frequency of current sources. Figure (7) also depicts the range of frequencies that in 
combination with power density requirements delineate the currently available HPM· . 
sources. Due to propagation con~erns, available microwave sources, and initial 
effectiveness testing the effective frequency range for a HPM weapon is 500 MHz to 12 
GHz. Ideally, it would fall between 500 MHz and 3 GHz. In addition to output power 
and frequency range requirements, a source should be stable in frequency «1 % 
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Figure (7) peak power comparisons 
It is useful to determine the amount of power that can be delivered at a distance 
for a given source and antenna. The power radiated, P r, is dependent upon the power 
from the source, Ps, the directivity of the antenna, GD, and the efficiency of the antenna, 
E. Directivity is the measure of an antenna's ability to concentrate radiated power in a 
particular direction. It can be expressed as the ratio of the beam area, QA, and the 41t 
steradians of all the solid angles: 







where G = fuD is the gain of the antenna. Q A is the beam area or "spot size" and is equal· 
to (nI4)(.Mll where 11B= 1.22 },JD is the half angle of the first minimum in the diffraction 
pattern of a circular antenna. One finds 
(IILB.3) 
where A is the antenna area, D is the diameter of the aperture, A is the transmitted 
frequency and 8 is the antenna efficiency. 
Ifthe range to the target is in the far-field region, then the intensity drops off 
proportional to l1R2, where R is the range to the target [12]. The far-field distance is 
Rff = 2D2/A. Using an antenna diameter of D = 1-10 m and a transmitted frequency of 1-
3 GRz, the far-field distance is not greater than 2 km. Since, the goal is to engage an 
inbound missile from 5-10 km, we can assume we are in the far-field. Therefore, 
neglecting atmospheric effects we have the power density at the target: 
(IILB.4) 
where As is the spot size of the beam. 
Another simple method for calculating power density at the target is to use 
nomographs. Figure (8) is a nomograph that provides a method for determining relevant 
RPM weapon parameters [13]. Since the nomograph does not account for attenuation 
losses and assumes a 100% efficient parabolic antenna, only ideal values are obtained. 
The nomograph can be used in two ways: 1) assume a required power density and find 
21 
the required technology and equipment 2) given physical and technological constraints, 
find the maximum power density for a given range. 
100 10 Frequency, GHz 1 0.1 10m 100m Spot size lkm (full width) 10krr 
Figure 8. HPM parameter nomograph. 
The use of the nomograph is explained by the following example. Choose a 
frequency of 5 GHz and a radiated power of 10 GW by placing a point at the intersection 
ofthe two values in the HPM sources quadrant. Next, choose an antenna diameter of 
22 
.--------------------------------------
10m, by drawing a vertical line from the first point to the intersection of the 10m line in 
the Aperture quadrant. By drawing a horizontal line from this point, we find a beam 
width of roughly 8.3 mrads. Next, choose a range of 10 km, by continuing the horizontal 
line until it crosses the 10 Ian line in the Range quadrant. The final step is to draw a 
horizontal line from the first point to the Power Density quadrant and then draw an 
intersecting vertical line from the Range quadrant. The result is a power density of 
100 W/cm2 and a full width spot size of80 m [13]. 
As microwave energy propagates through the atmosphere, it is attenuated by the 
water gas molecules present in the air. Figure (9), taken from High-Power Microwave 
Systems and Effects by Taylor- and Giri, and Figure (10), from High Power Microwaves 
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Figure 9 & 10. Attenuation due atmospheric attenuation 
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These Figures show that at the lower microwave frequencies attenuation due to 
oxygen and water vapor absorption is very small. However, at higher frequencies 
attenuation becomes a significant problem. Accounting for signal attenuation, a, 
provided by Figure (9) we arrive at the atmospheric corrected power density on the 
target: 
(III.B.5) 
Spherical spreading of the emitted energy can be an advantage or disadvantage 
depending on the intended mission. If the mission is to saturate a large area with 
microwave power, then the spreading will be an advantage. On the other hand, if 
multiple ships are operating in unison it might prove impossible to employ HPM for fear 
of irradiating another ship, due to the large beam size. 
Regardless of the mission, there are some inherent problems, "suicide" and 
"fratricide", that must be dealt with. These problems result from using an antenna-
directed weapon, side lobes and strong local fields [13]. Fratricide is unintended damage 
to nearby electronics or personnel due to side-lobe emissions from the weapon. In the 
"fog of war," the potential for damage to friendly forces near at hand could be a serious 
limitation. The problem may be somewhat mitigated by side lobe suppression, which 
would have to be fully investigated and understood. The second problem, suicide, is 
unintended damage to the subsystems of the HPM platform itself due to its own emitted 
pulse. This problem may be solved by shielding, but the weight and size of the extra 
shielding will be topside and must be accounted for when comparing systems [14]. 
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4. Effects 
In many studies and experiments, it has been shown that intense microwave 
radiation can have serious effects on today's electronics. Once microwave energy 
reaches a target, a sequence of penetration and propagation processes will take place from 
the outer surface into the electronics. The energy arrival can be via "front-door" or 
"back-door" paths. A front-door path is a path that is designed for microwave 
transmission. An example is a receiving dish that is connected to an electronic box via 
coaxial cable. A back-door path is an inadvertent point of entry (POE) for 
electromagnetic energy penetration, such as access doors, cracks, seams, connectors and 
cable shields [15]. 
Possible modes of electronic disruption are called intermodulation, latch-up, 
thermal damage, punch-through or digital upset, as described below. A more detailed 
description is available in High-Power Microwave Systems and Effects, by Taylor and 
Giri. 
Digital Upset: Digital circuits generally use CMOS or bipolar transistor technology and 
are vulnerable to HPM coupling damage. Damage can be temporary, a~ in the change of 
the stored or transmitted information due to indirect coupling. It may also be permanent 
when the HPM illumination is directed directly onto the chip package [16]. 
Intermodulation: Intermodulation is associated with electromagnetic interference and it 
stems from operating mUltiple sources with non-linear elements simultaneously. These 
elements can be located in the target's transmitters, response circuits or the propagation 
path [16]. 
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Punch-Through: Punch through is a when there is an increase in biasing voltage, which 
causes the depletion region to expand in a reverse biased pn junction. If the depletion 
region expands into another junction, then the high current may damage the junction [16]. 
Latch-Up: Latch-up is the condition when a semiconductor device no longer responds to 
input signals. Latch-up generally occurs when an inadvertent multi-junction is formed, 
which triggered disables the device. Latch-up can result from several sources including: 
photoelectric generation from ionizing radiation; thermal heating causing impact 
generation and when minority carriers are injected into the substrate by a transient 
forward bias on parasitic pn junction [16]. 
Figure (11) is a plot of damage thresholds vs. sample components, the interaction 
of microwave energy with these individual components becomes very complicated when 
the entire system is evaluated. Dll:e to the manner in which induced microwave energy 
must propagate, first through the external shielding, then the outer surface material and 
then the external cavities, to penetrate into the interior of the system. The energy must 
then interact with the internal wiring, internal cavities, and possibly internal shielding. 
Then finally, the residual energy must interact, with a vital component such as those 
listed in Figure (11). This final interaction may cause permanent or temporary damage, 
depending on the residual energy level and the damage threshold of the electronics. The 
kill mechanism and probability of kill (Pk) for any given target will be need to be 
assessed individually. The resultant damage is hard to predict without extensive testing 
of every piece of electronics targeted. Though many studies have been conducted on 
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small simple electronic devices, to compile the necessary database of effects on complex 
military hardware would be very costly. 





. Low-Power Transistors 
1111" 11111 III" 111m 1111111 
.01 .1 10 100 
Kilowatts 









, I 11111 1111'" 
.001 .01 .1 10 100 
Kilowatts 
Figure 11. Damage threshold power ranges for representative components 
5. Hardening 
Until recently, the use ofHPM as a weapon has not been a threat. Therefore, 
there is a dearth of information concerning the shielding ofHPM. However, there have 
been many studies done on EMP hardening, since we have lived with the threat of 
nuclear blasts for many decades. Despite the fact that the majority ofthe testi~g was not 
done at HPM frequencies, and therefore cannot be applied to HPM shielding, some 
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results remain valid. ,In theory, a Faraday shield, a simple metal enclosure, is an effective 
shield against microwave energy. 
The effectiveness of a Faraday shield can be simply demonstrated at home again 
with a digital watch and a microwave oven. Using the same model microwave oven and 
watch that were used to demonstrate the effectiveness of microwaves against electronics 
but now add a piece of aluminum foil. A second series of home experiments were done 
for this thesis. The watch was inserted into a small box constructed of aluminum foil. 
The foil box was then placed in the microwave and the oven was subsequently turned on. 
This process was repeated several times turning on the microwave oven for various time 
periods ranging from 1-90 seconds, checking the watch's after each exposure. The watch 
suffered no noticeable effects. 
Figure (12), taken from Principles and Techniques of Radiation Hardening by 
Norman Rudie, shows the shielding effectiveness for various meshes and woven screens. 
A woven screen of 0.002" copper has a shielding effectiveness of approximately 60dB at 
1 GRz. This provides a very effective shield against typical RPM frequencies. 
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Figure 12. Barrier Shielding Perfonnance for shielding windows [17] 
In addition to Faraday shielding, there are other methods to harden a system to 
microwave energy. They include the use oflow pass filters, diode limiters, feed-through 
capacitors, and the filling of any empty voids with filler material.. Therefore it appears 
that a hardening technique could be effective applied against incident microwave energy. 
If the shielding is not maintained vigorously, its effectiveness will decrease rapidly. This 
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makes shielding a room or a building exceedingly difficult, due to the human traffic. 
However, this would not be the case for an anti-ship missile, as they are rarely opened. 
6. Conclusion 
Due to their relatively large carrying capacity and available power, ships may be 
the first to deploy a HPM weapon. However, the issues of the spreading energy and 
shielding should be first resolved. It might be possible for tactics to be written that would 
enable a ship to defend itself without inadvertently impairing another ship. In addition, 
shielding against HPM may end up being an expensively prohibitive process. If so, these 
costs may counter the high cost of developing and deploying the HPM weapon. 
C. LASERS 
1. Background 
The second DEW approach invol:ves lasers. The ideal weapon is one that always 
hits its, target with sufficient energy to neutralize the target. Further, it should beable to, 
instantaneously hit any target in sight, no matter how far away it is. High-energy lasers 
are closer to ideal than any other weapon in that they shoot a precise beam of energy, 
which travels at the speed of light and only takes about 30 microseconds to travel 10 
km[18]. 
Laser weapons have been a fantasy weapon for several decades. Nevertheless, 
their reality was proven by the Air Force's ALL project of the late 1970s, and the Navy's 
MIRACL project ofthe1980s. While these two projects had many early successes that 
seemed to hold the promise of a laser weapon on the horizon, they also illustrated the 
vulnerabilities oflasers. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was another project of the 
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1980s. It was designed to provide the US with an "umbrella" capable of destroying 
incoming nuclear missiles, therefore rendering nuclear weapons as strategic weapons 
obsolete. However, the high cost of development, the collapse of the So"iet Union, and 
the overly optimistic predictions caused the SDI program to be halted. Consequently 
laser weapon research was neglected for many years, but the Air Force has revived it with 
its chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL) project. The Air Force is currently working very 
earnestly in solving the problems associated with laser weapons. The problems 
associated with lasers are their high cost, tracking requirements, weight, size, and 
atmospheric propagation problems. 
Due to the inherently short wavelengths of the lasers, a dish much smaller than 
that required for the use with HPM could be employed. Therefore, very little of the 
precious topside real estate would be used. This concept has'been previously covered 
[19]. The optics and requisite tracking system already exist to make this a weapon, 
though the system would require further engineering for deployment. As stated 
previously the chemical laser MlRACL has already successfully engaged missiles in 
flight at long range. 
Though MlRACL was a successful platform for testing the basic theory of laser 
effectiveness, it had a few shortcomings for being a deployable shipboard system. 
MlRACL is a chemical laser using Deuterium Flouride. Chemicals would need to be 
carried on board the ship, which would mean more space required and a somewhat 
limited magazine. The waste gases produced by the laser are also toxic, representing a 
personnel hazard and a storage problem. Lastly, the wavelength of3.8~m, which was 
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chosen to exploit an atmospheric propagation window, has proven to be inadequate 
because of thermal blooming. Since MIRACL is a chemical laser, its wavelength and 
vulnerability to' thermal blooming cannot be changed. 
An FEL may be able to correct these shortcomings. An FEL can be powered by a 
modified shipboard distribution system, giving it an almost unlimited magazine [20]. 
Additionally, due to the tunability of the FEL, the problem of atmospheric absorption 
may be overcome with the selection of a different wavelength laser beam. The FEL also 
has hazards and limitations. An operating FEL produces nuclear radiation and requires 
an electron beam dump, but these problems have been addressed [21]. Although, there is 
no theoretical reason for an FEL not to be able to produce several megawatts of power 
the current world record of only 340 W average power is held by Thomas Jefferson 
National Accelerator Facility, TJNAF [22]. There are plans to raise that to 20 kW within 
the next few years. 
2. Atmospheric Propagation 
One of the most important aspects of the laser weapon is the understanding the 
laser propagation through the air. This section primarily focuses on the propagation of 
laser energy and thermal blooming, pos,sibly the biggest hurdle for the realization of a 
laser weapon. 
We begin without atmospheric effects. Start with a definition of energy flux, (/J, 
or power density as the ratio of the power, P, to the spot size, A. We can mathematically 
express (/J as 
cJ>=P= P 
A 7r(R8/' (III.C.2.1) 
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R is the range and e is the beam half angle in the far field. Additionally the energy 
fluence, F, is the amount of energy deposited on a target in a given time. To find F, we 
can integrate cP with respect to time, t: 
F = r if>dt = if>r J) , (III.C.2.2) 
where r is the pulse length and cP is constant. We can get an expression for F by 
substituting Eq. (III.C.2.l) and e =1.22A!D, for a diffraction limited beam, into 
Eq. (III.C.2.2) where D is the diameter ofthe aperture and A is the wavelength oflight. 
Therefore, for propagation in the far-field in a vacuum we get: 
(III.C.2.3). 
Since fluence is a measure of how much energy is absorbed, it can also be related to 
target hardness. The greater the fluence threshold is, the harder it is for ~he laser to do 
damage .. 
In reality, the laser energy is not traveling through a vacuum, but rather through 
the atmosphere where there is attenuation. Figure (13) shows various atmospheric 
transmittance values for 0-15 ~m wavelengths, over a 1820-meter horizontal path at sea 
level. Figure (13) illustrates the importance of wavelength selection for laser weapon 
use. In a vacuum, we have 100% transmission, but Figure (13) shows a transmission 
range of 0-90% depending on wavelength. The difference is due to atmospheric 
attenuation. There are two main attenuation mechanisms associated with propagating 
through the atmosphere they are; scattering and absorption. Scattering is the re-direction 
of energy due to collisions with aerosols and other particles entrained in the air. If the 
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energy is deflected by a sufficient amount, it will not reach the target. The second 
attenuation mechanism, and ultimately more limiting, as we will find out later, is 
absorption. It is caused by the loss of energy to the atmosphere, due to molecular 
absorption. 
0, H:aO C02 H,o co, co, 
J nth C02 OJ 1 1 11 1 1 .l 
. }.t-Nur in'rared-~Middll!l inrtartd--f<------Far infrared--____ -+! 
Figure 13. Atmospheric Transmittance for 0-15 !lm 
Figure (13) is a good basic plot of transmittance, but a more useful plot would 
separate the effects of scattering and absorption. Figure (14) gives representative 
attenuation coefficients for scattering and absorption and it, shows the combination of the 
two as an extinction coefficient. The rural conditions of Figure (14) are conditions that 
MlRACL might typically encounter. However, we are more concerned with maritime 
conditions and they are generally different from rural conditions due to an increase in air 
moisture. Therefore, the two different atmospheric conditions have different attenuation 
coefficient values. Figure (15) shows the maritime attenuation coefficients for the same 
range of wavelengths. Notice that while the maritime extinction coefficients are 
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generally the same, the absorption and scattering coefficients differ vastly at some 
wavelengths. It is important that the atmospheric conditions for which the laser will 
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Figure 14 & 15. Atmospheric attenuation coefficients 
Looking at Figures (14) and (15), it would appear that scattering would be more 
limiting at shorter wavelengths. While it is true that the attenuation coefficient for 
scattering is larger than that for absorption, absorption leads to thermal blooming because 
the local heating of air'lowers the index of refraction. These small changes in refraction 
affect the propagating light beam as if the light beam where traveling through a lens. The 
beam may change direction "beam wander" or the intensity of the beam might fluctuate, 
"scintillation". We observe these effects in everyday life. These small changes in local 
. 
indexes of refraction cause the twinkling of the stars and the shimmering of distant 
objects on a hot day. In general, these effects are linear and a laser weapon can overcome 
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them with an increase in power or use of a fast tracking optical system. However, in 
certain cases, such as still air and for sufficiently high laser energy, a strong effective 
divergent lens is formed in the air, causing the laser energy to be dispersed. Only a 
fraction of the dispersed energy would reach the target. This effect is known as "thermal 
blooming", and it is non-linear in nature. Increasing power levels only speeds the onset 
of thermal blooming. Thermal blooming is most serious for head-on shots, due to the 
still air. We need to find a wavelength that minimizes absorption. 
Since lasers are capable of producing narrow laser lines we need a more detailed 
plot of atmospheric transmission than supplied by Figure (13). If we used Figure (13) we 
might miss a window or chose a wavelength such that there would be very little 
transmission. Figure (16), taken from Rudie [23], shows a more detailed plot of 
representative transmission that might be used vice Figure (13). Additionally, we need to 
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Figure 16(a-c). Atmospheric Transmission 
Different types of lasers produce different wavelengths and different light spectra. 
Figure (17) shows the laser output of two chemical lasers. The MlRACL is a nominal 
3.8 ~m laser, but it actually has many laser lines. Ifwe use the atmospheric transmission 
plot for only 3.8 ~m, some of the other laser lines may cause thermal blooming. What is 
needed is a laser that is· capable of putting out a single narrow line. For ship defense, the 
FEL would be the preferred choice and could be designed to the desired wavelength, thus 
delaying or avoiding the onset of thermal blooming. 
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Figure 17. HF and DF laser output 
In 1997, Cook and Albertine published a paper on the atmospheric propagation 
issues related to a maritime deployed high-energy laser weapon system (HEL WS) [24]. 
Figure (18) shows a comparison of absorption coefficients, computer simulated, for the 
different wavelengths selected. The most promising wavelength from this plot is 
1.042 11m, with the Y AG laser line of 1.06 11m as a close second. Both of these laser 
lines show significant improvement over the MIRACL laser line of 3.8 11m for maritime 
conditions. 
Figure 18. Total Absorption 11km [24] 
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Figure (19) shows the total extinction coefficients, computer simulated, for the 
same wavelengths. It is apparent from Figure (19) that while absorption coefficients of 
the shorter wavelengths are a couple of magnitudes better than those of the longer 
wavelengths, their extinction coefficients suffer by a factor of2-3 for extreme weather 
conditions. The study concluded that the 1.6 flm laser line was the best choice due to eye 
safety concerns. Its performance variation was the smallest under different atmospheric 
conditions. If it is possible to prevent thermal blooming at this range, then the added 
benefit of eye safety would warrant the use of this wavelength. However, it appears that 
the shorter wavelengths of 1.042 flm and 1.06 flm are preferred. 
Figure 19. Total extinction 11km [24] 
3. Conclusion 
In conclusion, laser weapons have a proven capability to be viable defense 
weapon in the future. However, for lasers to become deployable, they must address the 
many atmospheric conditions that affect a laser beam during its propagation from the ship 
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to the target. The most threatening effect is thennal blooming, as the onset of thennal 
blooming prevents the laser energy from reaching the inbound missile. Tactics that 
would have two ships working together, each providing air defense for the other, in order 
to avoid propagating the laser beam through stagnant air conditions. Since this would 
limit the ship flexibility, it would be preferable to find another solution. 
While choosing a shorter wavelength of light can reduce the amount of energy 
absorbed by the atmosphere, these shorter wavelengths are more susceptible to extinction 
due to adverse weather conditions. To make the laser a robust weapon system, the 
problem of adverse weather must be solved. Current studies are detennining the losses of 
laser energy in rain and fog for power beaming energy to space stations [25]. 
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IV. FEL THEORY 
A. BASIC OPERATION 
A free electron laser (FEL) uses a source of electrons typically from an electron 
gun, that are injected into an accelerator where they reach relativistic energy, ]11lC2, where 
ris the Lorentz factor, m is the electron rest mass and c is the velocity of light. In 
addition to being accelera~ed, the electrons also exit the accelerator in a stream of 
microbunches, whi~h were formed due to the dynamics of the accelerator. These 
microbunches of relativistic electrons are the input into the undulator, which is the heart 
ofthe FEL. 
Within the undulator, the optical field is amplified by the interaction ofthe 
relativistic electron beam, the optical wave, and the spatially periodic magnetic field 
produced by the magnets of the undulator. The length of the undulator, L, is equal to the 
product of number of undulator periods, N, and the undulator wavelength, -1-0 , as shown in 
Figure (20). The spatially periodic magnetic field, represented by the up and down 
arrows, can be from electromagnets, but is usually constructed with permanent magnets. 
Figure (20) also depicts the mirrors of an optical resonator, which is needed for FEL 
oscillator. The mirrors forming the resonator contain the optical field while it interacts 
with the electron beam. The mirror at the far end of the undulator is partially transmitting 
or has a hole in it to allow a small percentage, typically 1-10%, of the optical field power 
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Figure (20). Basic undulator and resonator configuration. 
The amplification of ~aser light from the resonator is dependent upon the 
interaction of the electron beam, the optical wave, and the magnetic field of the 
undulator. The electron bunches that are emitted from the accelerator, are traveling at a 
speed of /3zc, where /3;' is the axial component of the velocity and c is the speed of light .. 
As the electron bunches traverse the length of the undulator, they are accelerated by the 
magnets of the undulator in the transverse direction. In order for the electrons to interact 
strongly with the optical field, they must satisfy the resonance condition one wavelength 
of light, A, passes over an electron as the electron travels a distance of one undulator 
wavelength, AD [26]. The resonance condition relating the electron energy, A, and AD can 
also be expressed as: 
where K = eBAol2nmc2 is the undulator parameter that will be derived in the next section 
and yis the relativistic Lorentz factor. 
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B. PENDULUM EQUATION 
The energy transfer to the optical beam from the electron beam occurs in the 
undulator section. Assuming that we are analyzing a helically polarized undulator, then 
the magnetic field can be represented as 
(IV.B.1) 
where ko=2nlAo and z is along the undulator axis. The electrical and magnetic field of the 
optical wave, can be represented by 
Er = E(cos(P,), sin(P,),O) , (IV.B.2) 
Br = B(sin(P,),cos('F),O), (IV.B.3) 
where 'P=kz-ax.+(/J; k=27l1A; m being the radial frequency, kbeing the wave number and 
.¢ being the optical phase angle. 
To be able to describe electron motion, we must determine what significant forces . 
are present in the undulators that affect the motion of an electron. We start with the 
relativistic Lorentz force equations, 
a(rP) = -~[E + P- x (B + B )~ at me r r u ~, (lV.BA) 
ar e-
-=--p·E at me r' (IV.B.5) 
(IV.B.6) 
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If you substitute the undulator and the optical fields into the Lorentz force equations, you 
get the following 
(IV.B.7) 
(IV.B.8) 
ar = _ ~ E[P x cos('?) - f3 y sine'?) ]. 
at me 
(IV.B.9) 
For a relativistic electron E(l-f3J=E/2;f, which is negligible compared to f3zB for r» 1. 
We can ignore the E term in the first equation and only include the transverse force of the 
undulator, which gives us 
a~,B J _ e f3 ( . (k' k) 
--L.O-=-<- - --B z -sm "z),cos( oZ)'O , 
at me 
(IV.B.IO) 
which we can now integrate this with respect to t to find that 
- K( . ) f3J- = -- cos(koz),sm(koz),O . (IV.B.lI) 
r 
The transverse motion of the electron is very small since f3.l=K/r<<1 for r»l. Insert 





where the electron phase is ? = (k+ko}z-ox. The initial value for the electron phase is 
?(O) = ?o = (k+ko}zo at t = o. For relativistic electrons k»ko so that ?o=kzo = 21lZ/A. 
The electron phase, t;, determines the z position relative to an optical wavelength, A. 
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Now we use ~ 1. in the third Lorentz force equation to solve for 1-
K = eBAd2mnc2 is called the undulator parameter. If we now take the time derivative to 
relate drfdt and dflldt 
(IV.B.13) 
Taking the first derivative ofthe electron phase, S, with respect to time, we get 
(IV.B.13a) 
then the second derivative of ? is 
(IV.B.14) 
Solving Eq. (IV.B."l4) for~z and then substituting into Eq: (IV.B.13) gives us 
(IV.B.15) 





where OJo = OJ(J +K2)/21, mo= koc, m = kc and If we then solve Eq. (IV.B.16) for t and 
substitute in Eq. (IV.B.12) for i we get 
? 2moi 2eKEOJo (I'd.) 
':> = -- = cos,:> + If' . 
. y y 2mc 
, (IV.B.17) 
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Define the dimensionless time as r= ct/L so time equals zero at the beginning of 
the undulator and one at the end. Also define the dimensionless complex optical field 
a = lale i ¢ where lal = 4ITeNKLIEII y 2mc 2 , so we arrive at 
,= lalcos(S' + ¢). (IV.B.I8) 
where (.) = d( ... )1 dr. 
We can also define the dimensionless electron phase velocity, v= ~ , where if v = 
0, the electrons are at resonance. The electron phase velocity is proportional to the 
electron energy, so when v decreases, the electron is giving up energy to the optical field. 
The maximum energy loss from the' electrons occurs when cos (1t) = -lor when electrons 
are bunched at S' +¢ = IT. 
C. WAVE EQUATION 
The development of a complex optical wave equation starts from Maxwell's wave 
equation acting on a optical vector potential A (f ,t) that is driven by a current density 
[
-2 1 02 ]- _ 4IT -V ---- A(r t) = --J 2~2' 1-' 
C ut C 
(IV.C.I) 
where ?=8/a2+8/0/+8/oi. The vector potential A (z,t) for the helical FEL is 
A(z,t) = ~ E(z,t)[sin(kz - O)t + ¢(z,t)),cos(kz - O)t + ¢(z,t)),O] 
OJ 
where the electric field E is 





- loA E=--- . 
c at (IV.C.4) 
Since the plane wave is traveling in the z direction, t7 = 8/ oi and the operator 
ofEq. (IV.C.l) becomes 
(IV.C.S) 
The first derivative and second derivatives of the' vector potential A (z, t) with respect to z, 
give 
-2 A =-- k+- [cos(l'),-sm(P'),O] 0
2 
- 1 oE [o¢] . 
oz koz oz 
+! 0
2 ~ [sin(l'),cos(l'),o]+! oE [k + o¢][cOS(l'),-Sin(l'),O] 
koz koz oz 
+ E 02~[cOS(1'),-sin(1'),O]+ E (k+ 0¢)2[-sin(1'),-cos(1'),O]. (IV.C.6) 
koz k oz ' 
Assume that the amplitudes and phases vary slowly with respect to time and distance 
traveled along the z axis so that E and ¢ change slowly: OE/ t3z < < kE, o¢l t3z < < k¢, 
OE/d« ())E, o¢ld «())¢, and ()) = kc. This allows us to use only the first-order 
derivatives because the second-order derivatives are small and Eq. (IV.C.6) simplifies to 
0
2
2 A ~ 2 0E [cos(l'),-sin(l'),O] + E(k + 2 o¢)[_ sin(l'),-cos(l'),O] & & & (IV.C.7) 
Taking the second time derivative of the vector potential A (z,t) 
--2 A =- --()) [cos(1'),-sin(1'),O]+-2 [sin(l'),cos(l'),O] ()) 0
2 
- oE [o¢ ] oE2 
c at at at at 
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+ 8E [8¢ _ OJJ[cOS(~),-Sin(~),O]+ E 8¢: [cos(~),-sin(~),O] & & & 
+ E[: -,,>]' [- sin('P),-cos('P),O 1 . (IV.C.8) 
The amplitudes and phases are both slowly-varying and we ignore second-order 
derivatives. If we also multiply by lle2, Eq. (IV.C.8) becomes 
~ a2? A == -2~ aE [cos(~),-sin(~),O]+ ~(coE - 2E 8¢)[- sin(~),-cos(~),o] (IV.C.9) 
c ar c at c at 
Recombine the two halves so we have 




] - [aE'I aEJ . 
c 2 8t 2 az c at 
+ 2E[a¢ +.!. a¢J[- sin(~),-cos(~),o]. 
az c at . 
(IV.C.IO) 
Define dimensionless time r= ctlL so that r equals zero at the beginning of the 
undulator and one at the end. Follow a new position z -+ z + ct. and use the chain rule to 
simplify the operator for the wave equation: 
4;r - [1 8EJ[ . ] [1 a¢J[ .' ] 
--JJ.. == 2 -- cos(~),sm(~),O +2E -- -sm(tp),-cos(~),O 
c L 8r L ar 
(IV.C.II) 
As for the right side of the equation, we know the current density for a single 
electron is JJ.. = -ecpJ... From Eq. (IV.B.ll), the electron trajectory, we have 
- ecK [ . ] JJ.. = -- cos(koz),sm(koz),O . (IV.C.I2) 
r 
where K is the undulator parameter, ko is the undulator wave number, and ris the Lorentz 
factor. Eq. (IV.C.I2) is substituted into Eq. (IV.C.1I) to get , 
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4;reK [ . ] 
--- cos(koz),sIn(koz),O == 
r 
2[~ aE][cOS(If'),Sin(If'),O]+ 2E[~ a¢][_ sin(If'),-cos(If'),O] (IV.C.13) 
L ar L ar 
Eq. (IV.C.13) can be separated using two unit vectors representing change in E and 




2;reLK [cos(koz),sin(koz),Ol [cos(If'),sin(If'),O], 
r 




where sis the electron phase (k+ko}z-ux. Performing the same steps for a~/m gives 
o¢ 2;reLK. (r . d.) 
-= SIn,:> +'{-' . 
or r 
(IV.C:I6) 
Eq. (IV.C.15) and Eq. (IV.C.l6) are the wave equation driven by single electrons. A 
more useful equation use~ the sum over many electrons in the FEL beam. This can be 










o¢ 21lepLK . (I' "') 
-= <SIn '=' +'f' >. 
or r 
(IV.C.I8) 
Taking the derivative of the complex electric field E = IEle i¢ with respect to 
dimensionless time, T, and insert Eq. (IV.C.I7) and Eq. (IV.C.I8) as appropriate, to get 
t3E = 21lepLK [(cos{( + ¢)) _ i(sin{( + ¢)) }i¢, 
or r 
(IV.C.I9) 
which can be further simplified 
t3E = 21lepLK (e- i(>. 
or r 
(IV.C.20) 
And from the pendulum equation, we know that our dimensionless optical wave 
field is a = lalei¢, where lal = 4;reNKLIEVlmc2, so that the wave equation is now 
az 0 • .( -i r) or =a=-] e ' , (IV.C.2I) 
where the dimensionless current isj = 8:li pNK2L2/rmc2 . The growth of the optical 
field depends on the dimensionless current,j, and the electron phase average. If there is 
no current or no electron bunching, then there is no growth of the optical field. 
D. LOW GAIN FEL 
Combining the pendulum equation, derived from the relativistic Lorentz force 
equations, and the optical field wave equation, derived from Maxwell's wave equation, 
yields a result valid for either low gain or high gain, and weak or strong optical fields. 
Low gain occurs when the dimensionless current is small,j < 1l, and there is little change 
o 
in the value of the optical field, a == O. Weak fields are defined by a small dimensionless 
optical field, or lal < 1lwhere there is not much change in the electron phase velocity, v. 
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When designing a weapon system the FEL should have a high average power. The 
current world record for the highest average power FEL is a low gain design located at 
the Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility, TJNAF. An FEL having low gain 
typically operates as an FEL oscillator that takes many passes through the undulator in 
order to build an optical field within the resonator. Single-pass gain is defined as the 
fractional change in optical power as it makes a single pass down the undulator 
From the conservation of energy, the change in the electron pulse energy is 
converted to a change in the optical pulse energy. The energy of a relavistic electron is 
equal to yme2, and the change in an electron's energy is Ayme2. Near resonance, small 
changes in the electron phase velocity, Y, are given by Av= 41liVApr[26]. The energy 
change of a single electron is 
A 2 yme 2 Au LJyme = . 
47rN 
(IV.D.1) 
Since we are dealing with a pulse rather than a single electron, we can assume an average 
phase velocity for all the electrons within the pulse, <U>. Therefore the average change in 
electron beam energy is 
A 2 yme 2 « U > -uJ LJrme = . 
4trN 
(IV.D.2) 
With low gain in weak fields, the optical phase, , can be written as a power 
series in ao using perturbation theory [26], 
(IV.D.3) 
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where (0 is the initial electron phase, Vo is the initial electron phase velocity, and ao is the 
initial optical field amplitude. Since the electron phase velocity, v, equals the derivative 
of (with respect to T, it also can be written as a power series in ao using perturbation 
theory, 




[ 1 + -+. -"4(cos(2(" + 2VoT) -cos(2(o)) + COS(V{)T) 
Vo 
(IV.D.4) 
By averaging over a uniform distribution of the initial electron phases in the beam, 
average phase change is 
The number of electrons in the beam is equal to the electron density, p, multiplied 
by the elemental volume unit, dV. Since the electron beam only amplifies the light within 
the area where the two beams overlap, a filling factor, F, must be included. The filling 
factor is the area of the electron beam divided by the larger area of the light beam, 
(IV.D.6) 
where rb is the electron beam radius and wo"is the radius of the optical beam waist. The 
average change in the electron beam energy is then 
(IV.D.7) 
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Since gain is defined as the change in optical wave energy divided by the initial 
optical wave energy, the increase in optical wave energy is equal to the decrease in the 
electron beam energy: The gain, G, is calculated by dividing the change in electron beam 
energy by the initial optical wave energy within dV, 2E2dV18tr. Substituting Eq. (IV.D.S) 
and Eq. (IV.D.6) into Eq. (IV.D.7), we can solve for gain 
(IV.D.8) 
wherej=8N(etrKL/pFlymc2 is the dimensionless current density. Using Eq. (IV.D.8) 
and a dimensionless current density of j = 1, gives a plot of gain versus initial electron 
phase velocity, vo, can be constructed. The plot, see Figure (21), shows that for an initial 
electron phase velocity of Vo = 0 the gain, G, will be zero, due to an equal number of 
electrons gaining and'iosing energy. The gain, G, increases, reaching a maximum value 
at Vo = ,2.6, because more electrons lose energy than gain. Then gain decreases to G = 0 . 
for Vo > > 1 as the electron phase and optical phase have less and less interaction due to 
the high initial electron phase velocity. The anti symmetry of Figure (21) shows that if 
Vo < Othen the gain, G, will be negative because the electrons will have a net gain of 
energy from the optical pulse. Eq. (IV.D.8) shows the gain, G, is also proportional to the 
dimensionless current density, j. For increasing values of j the .amplitude of the optical 
pulse increases, the optical pulse width narrows and short pulse effects are increased. 
53 
**** FELGainand Phase CurVes **** 
0.135 
-12 12 
Figure 21. Low Gain Spectrum for Low Current and Weak Fields [26] 
E. SHORT PULSE EFFECTS 
FEL oscillators in general use short electron pulses rather than a continuous beam. 
Recall that near resonance one wavelength of light passes over an electron as the electron 
travels one undulator wavelength. In the time the electron pulse travels the length of the 
undulator, it has slipped behind the light pulse by NA, this distance is defined as the 
"slippage distance". If the electron pulse is much longer than the slippage distance, then 
each part of the electron pulse experiences different gain due the different local electron 
density, p, and would have to be treated accordingly. FEL amplifiers typically have 
electron pulses that are much longer than the slippage distance. In the FEL oscillator, the 
electron pulse length is often on order of the slippage distance, so that the electron and 
optical pulses actually pass over each other. 
An effect that stems from the short pulses in an FEL oscillator is known as 
"lethargy"[26]. The light pulses are bounced between resonator mirrors separated by a 
distance, S, which is greater than the length of the undulator. Taking a time, t=2S!c to 
complete a full cycle. In order to maintain the FEL interaction the bounce time of the 
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laser pulses must be synchronized with the sequence of electron pulses from the 
accelerator so that the electron and optical pulses enter the undulator together. When the 
pulses are timed to arrive exactly together at the beginning of the undulator, this 
condition is called exact synchronism, which is shown in figure (21). 
I **** FEL Pulse Evolution **** 
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Figure 21. FEL oscillator at exact synchronism 
Surprisingly, the FEL has no steady state power at exact synchronism, which can 
be explained in the following manner. The light pulse and the electron pulse enter the 
undulator together and begin to interact, but initially there is no gain, because there is no 
electron bunching. As the light pulse interacts with the electron pulse, the electrons in 
the pulse begin to bunch and gain is developed. As the pulses travel down the undulator 
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together gain increases. Since the light pulse moves ahead of the electron pulse the 
majority of the amplification is in the rear of the light pulse. The centroid ofthe light 
pulse moves back and in effect travels at a speed slightly less than c. If the two pulses 
start together at the beginning ofthe undulator, the light pulse will fall behind over many 
passes and the coupling between the two pulses will be lost. Eventually the resonator 
losses will cause the optical pulse to decay, and the FEL will fail to operate. In order for 
the FEL to operate, we need to advance the entry of the light pulse compared to the 
electron pulse. This advance is accomplished by shortening the resonator length slightly. 
F. DE SYNCHRONIZATION EFFECTS 
Desynchronism can seriously affect the performance of the FEL. 
Desynchronization is adjusted by moving one of the mirrors of the resonator cavity 
inward by a small amount (LIS == 2-10 /lm). The value of de synchronism is given by 
d = _ 2L1S 
NA' 
where LIS is the decrease in the distance between the mirrors. Desynchronism is 
(IV.F.l) 
normalized by the slippage distance, N A, and gives the displacement between the electron 
and optical pulses at r= 0 on each pass [26]. 
In figure (21) de synchronism was d= 0 and there was no steady state power. So 
several computer simulations were run in order to investigate the effect desynchronism 
had on gain and power. In figure (22), the FEL parameters used a de synchronism of 
, , j.









**** FEL Pulse Evolution **** 
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Figure 23. FEL oscillator at small de synchronism 
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Figure (23) shows the peak power and peak field strength, lal == 200, are reached 
between n = 800 and n = 1000 passes, with steady-state power, Pen), being reached after 
approximately n = 1800 passes. Figure (23) also shows the evolution to a narrow optical 
spectrum, P(v,n), and a broad electron spectrum, f(v,n). Although there appears to be a 
high steady-state power level, the FEL oscillator is very sensitive to small changes in d. 
A more detailed analysis of the effects of desynchronism for the TJNAF are included in 
section VI. 
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G. LIMIT CYCLE BEHAVIOR 
Limit cycle behavior is a possible result of operating the FEL in strong fields with 
short pulse effects. The combination of the fields present in the undulator can result in 
what is known as trapped-particle instability. Trapped-particle instability is generated 
when the height of the separatrix is large and most electrons travel in closed paths. The 
electrons in the closed paths are trapped in deep potential wells and tend to oscillate at the 
synchrotron frequency, Us = M [26]: These oscillations mix with the optical carrier 
frequency causing modulation of the optical wave envelope and sidebands at the 
synchrotron frequency. The modulation of the optical pulse shape in combination with 
the desynchronism effect and resonator losses creates an optical pulse that varies 













**** FEL Pulse Evolution **** 
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Figure 24. Example of Limit Cycle Behavior 
The modulation of the optical field first grows due to slippage and desynchronism. As 
seen in the optical pulse evolution la(z,n)l, subpulses form at the rear of the pulse due to 
the modulation of the optical pulse at the synchrotron frequency. Although the centroid 
of the optical pulse is held constant with respect to the electron pulse, the features 
continue to move forward in z at each successive pass. As the subpulses move forward 
with respect to the centroid, they first enter a region of higher gain and grow, then 
desynchronism moves the pulse forward where the resonator losses cause decay. The 
optical field amplitude oscillates as the subpulses formed in the rear of the pulse move 
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forward, eventually dying out in the region where there is no gain. Figure (24) shows the 
output power, Pen), oscillating due to modulation of the optical field. 
Limit cycle behavior corresponds to the creation of sidebands in the optical 
spectrum and widens the output light spectrum of the FEL, which can be seen in 
Figure (24). As discussed in section III.C02, we need a narrow light-spectrum to exploit 
an atmospheric propagation window. Therefore, limit cycle behavior may be an 
undesired effect. Fortunately, FEL designers understand limit cycle behavior well 
enough to control its by simply altering de synchronism. 
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V. LASER MATTER INTERACTION 
A. . CONTINUOUS WAVE LASERS 
We have discussed the generation of laser energy and its propagation through the 
atmosphere. We now consider what happens when the laser energy strikes the target. Of 
primary interest is the laser matter interaction at the surface ofthe missile. When the 
laser energy strikes the material, some of the energy is absorbed and some is reflected. 
The absorbed energy causes a rise in the surface temperature. If sufficient energy is 
deposited, the material melts and the laser beam bores through the material. The required 
energy per unit area [27,28] is 
Eo =pdlc(TM -To(1+0.2M2))+L1HMJ, 
where p is the density of target material, d is the target thickness, C is the specific heat of 
the material, T M is the melting temperature, To is the ambient air temperature, M is the 
mach number of the missile, To(l +0. 2M2) is the temperature of the missile nose traveling 
at mach speed M, and '&/Mis the heat of melting of the material. For aluminum traveling 
at mach speed M = 1, we find that an energy density, Eo == 3000' j/cm2 is needed for 
melting aluminum. If the power density at the target from a laser weapon is taken to be 
1MWover 100cm2,or 10kW/cm2, it would take approximately one-third of a second to 
provide sufficient energy to melt through one centimeter of aluminum, if all the energy 
were absorbed. With a one second dwell time, a substantial fraction of the incident 
power can be reflected as long as 3000j/cm2 is absorbed. For a Mach 2 missile, the 
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energy density needed to melt the aluminum is only Eo =2000 j/cm2 since the missile is 
already hot, so faster missiles require shorter dwell times or less power. 
B. SHORT LASER PULSES 
Short pulsed lasers, microseconds or shorter, are capable of producing impulse 
damage in addition to the thermal damage. When the laser power is delivered in pulses, 
the peak power increases and may cause new effects beyond thermal heating. Due to the 
higher peak laser energy, there can be rapid vaporization at the target surface, so that a 
strong pressure wave is formed by the recoil from the vapor blowoff. The peak of the 
pressure wave, or impulse, induces a shock front, while the rear of the wave induces a 
rarefaction wave. The shock front reflects when it reaches a free surface at the rear of the 
material. The superposition of the reflected and incident waves results in stress at the 
free surface, which can exceed the material strength causing spalling. [29] 
Figure (25) is an example of the result of spaUing in a 25 Ilm thick MetGlass 
sample due to impulse delivered by a single 2.2ns, 26 J laser pulse at A. = 1.06 Ilm 
wavelength focused to a 500 Ilm spot [30]. 
Figure 25. Spalling in Metglass 
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Creation of a vapor at the material's surface is necessary for impulse generation 
leading to spalling damage. Assuming the thickness of the material exceeds the thermal 
diffusion length, D = 2(Klp)1I2,where K is the thermal diffusivity equal to cm2/s and tp is 
the laser pulse length, a rough estimate for the onset of vaporization requires an energy 
density Eo ~ DpLv, where Lv is the heat of vaporization [31]. For an one picosecond laser 
pulse, the thermal diffusion length in aluminum is D == 2 ~m. Using 1 MWover 100cm2 
on target and a pulse length of a few picoseconds for an FEL laser weapon, we find that 
no vapor is formed so there would be no impulse or spalling damage. 
C. ULTRA-SHORT LASER PULSES 
In recent years, new laser capabilities have allowed damage research with ultra-
short laser pulses, from picosecond to femtoseconds. Ultra-short laser pulse lengths 
deliver energy to a metal at such a.fast rate that the metal lattice cannot respond, but the 
electrons can [34]. The electrons rapidly increase in temperature so that the difference 
between electron and lattice temperatures can be as much as a few thousand degrees. 
Eventually, electron-phonon interactions distribute the excess energy between the 
electrons and the lattice in a time equal to a few phonon oscillation periods, a few to tens 
of picoseconds [35]. Higher fluences produce larger temperature differences between 
the electrons and the lattice, so that more electron-phonon collisions are required for 
thermalization [36]. 
A theory developed to describe the effect of pulse-duration on optical damage to 
metals argues that with ultra-short pulses, the electrons penetrate the material to a certain 
heat deposition depth before coupling to the lattice [37]. For pulses shorter than the 
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lattice relaxation time, the heat-deposition depth is relatively large and the resulting 
damage threshold fluence, Eth, is independent of pulse duration. For pulse lengths longer' 
than a critical time, 'tc, which is larger than the relaxation time by a factor of C/Ce T M 
where C is the material heat capacity, Ce is the electron heat capacity, T M is the melting 
temperature, the diffusion of energy to the lattice becomes important. In this case, Eth 
will scale as the square root of the pulse length, ('tp )112 [38-40]. Figure (26) shows the 
dependence of the damage threshold fluence, Eth' on pulse length for Cu and Mo [40]. 
The experimental results show a lower damage threshold fluence, Eth' as the pulse length 
is decreased down to one picosecond. For pulses shorter than one picosecond, Eth 
becomes independent of pulse length. Figure (26) implies that there may be as much as a 




Figure 26. Damage threshold energy vs. pulse length [40] 
Research has also examined the threshold for ultra-short pulses damaging 
dielectrics [41,42]. Figure (27) [42], shows the same basic trend as with Figure (26) for 
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metals. For long nanosecond pulses, the damage threshold decreases with decreasing 
pulse length as ('"tp) 112 and does not depend on pulse length for very short, picosecond 
pulses. The critical pulse length, '"te, for the transition was hundreds of picoseconds for 
metals, but is only a few picoseconds for dielectrics. As with metals, it appears that there 
may be as much as a factor of ten advantage when using shorter picosecond pulses 
compared to longer nanosecond pulses. 
From these studies, it may be inferred that there is the possibility of decreasing 
the fluence required to cause damage to a material with ultra-short picosecond pulses 
compared to cw or short nanosecond pulses. If this is true, then it may be possible that 
the energy required to damage' an in-bound missile could be significantly reduced. The 
advantage could decrease the size of the FEL required on-board ship, decrease the 
possibility of thermal blooming because of lower propagating power, and decrease the 
dwell time on target. 
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Figure 27. Damage Fluence vs. Pulse Width for Dielectrics 
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VI. THOMAS JEFFERSON NATIONAL LABORATORY 
FELs producing kilowatt average power do not yet exist, and it will be many 
years before the FEL will be usable as a laser weapon for the Navy's needs. However, 
the TJNAF FEL is an important step in that direction. Two years after breaking ground 
and beginning construction, the TJNAF FEL achieved first-light on June 17, 1998 
producing 155 W of cw power. This eclipsed the previous record of 11 W held by 
Vanderbilt University. In late November 1988, the TJNAF FEL more than doubled its 
average power to 340W. In the near future, the TJNAF's goal is to achieve 1 kW, and 
then move on to a goal of20 kW. 
Figure (28) shows the basic design of the current laser. Figure (29) shows the 
modification planried for the 20kW infrared wavelength FEL and a lkW ultraviolet 
wavelength FEL. Currently, the electrons are supplied by a 350 keV photocathode gun 
that are accelerated first by a lOMe V superconducting cyromodule, then by a 47 MeV 
superconducting accelerator, to achieve a 57 MeV electron beam energy. The electrons 
then enter the undulator, or "wiggler", to amplify the copropagating laser light as 
described in section IV. The wiggler cqvers the wavelength range from A = 3.0 to 6.6 !-lm 
using N = 40 periods of Ao = 2.7 cm. The initial results achieving 340 W did not 
recirculate the electron beam. When energy recirculation at full current is achieved in the 
future, the estimated power output at A = 3 !-lm wavelength is 980 W or about 1kW. 
TJNAF has achieved 124 W output power using partial current in their recirculation ring. 
The recirculation ring will eventually play an important role as it is designed take the 
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electrons from the output of the wiggler, and send them back through the 47 Me V 
cyromodule, which would than act as a decelerator to recover the electron beam energy. 
This conserves energy by using "spent" electrons to help feed RF power to the 
cyromodule, and also reduces the beam dump shielding since significant energy is 
extracted from the electrons. These two features make the use of recirculation attractive 
for future shipboard designs. 
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Figure 29. Diagram of Envisioned TJNAF FEL 
The performance of the current TJNAF FEL is now studied using simulations. 
Desy~chronism, discussed in section IV.E, has an import~nt effect on output power and 
optical pulse shape. It is one of the parameters used to controllimit-cyc1e behavior, as 
discussed in section IV.F. 
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In these simulations, TJNAF FEL electron pulse bunch length is taken to be 100-
200 /-lm, the length of the resonator is 801 cm, the resonator losses are 10%, the number 
ofundulator periods is N = 40, the undulator parameter is K = 0.96, the undulator 
wavelength is Ao = 2.7 cm. The rayleigh length is 40 cm, the electron charge per bunch is 
l/e = 60 pC, the pulse repetition rate is 18.725 MHz, and the electron energy is 
rme2 == 3 8Me V. The Lorentz factor is the ratio of electron energy to the electron rest 
mass energy and is r= 75. The electron pulse length is estimated in the range of 
0.33-0.66 ps. The peak current esti1p.ated from the charge per bunch and pulse length is 
90-180 amps depending on the pulse length taken. The value of desynchronism, 
d = LJS/N A, was varied to see the various effects on optical power and gain. 
Figure (30), shows that large and small values of de synchronism result in small 
gain. Since desyncbronism controls the coupling of the electron and optical pulses over 
many passes, if desynchronism is too large or too small there will not be efficient 
coupling. A maximum gain of almost G == 300% was found to occur at de synchronism of 
d== 0.3. 
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Gain vs. Dsynchronism 
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Figure 30. Gain vs. Desynchronism 
The values of the electron pulse length and therefore the pulse peak current are 
not accurately known in the TJNAF experiment so that a range of values is used in the 
simulations. Pulse lengths of 0.33 ps, 0.4 ps, 0.45 ps, 0.5 ps, 0.6 ps were used and the 
corresponding peak current was varied to keep the total pulse change the same. Graphs 
of power level vs. de synchronism for each pulse length were constructed. As the pulse 
length decreases, coupling is reduced because of lethargy. But, higher peak current for a 
shorter pulse compensates. Figure (31), shows the steady-state optical power as 
de synchronism is varied over small values. Superimposed are the results of each of the 
pulse lengths sampled. 
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Figure 31. A composite of Power vs. Desynchronism 
At low values like d == 0.001 the power initially increases rapidly, with increasing 
desynchronism. The simulations indicate an average power of324 W, which is in close 
agreement with the observed average power of 340 W, when TJNAF set the FEL record. 
More stable operation is formed for values of d > 0.1, showh in figure (32). As d 
increases past d == 0.04, power steadily decreases. Simulations were also run for d> 0.2, 
and the power levels slowly decreased until finally reaching a zero power level at d == 0.7. 
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Figure 32. A composite of Power vs. Desynchronism 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis investigate~ ship self-defense against anti-ship missiles. The kinetic 
energy weapon systems were found not suitable for ship defense in the future. Computer 
simulation determined that CIWS is inadequate for current threats. When defensive 
missiles engage inbound missiles prior to terminal maneuvers, they can be successful. 
However, the N:avy's current role requires ships to operate within the littoral region for 
gunfire support. This places the ship inside the effective range of the standard missile. 
So that the ship's flexibility would be curtailed in order to ensure ship safety. 
Two promising kinetic energy weapons were evaluated: long wavelength high 
power microwaves (HPM) and short wavelength lasers. Diffraction at long wavelengths 
'spreads the HPM energy over a large area reducing intensity; and shielding the missile 
appears to be a simple, non-costly procedure. 
Short wavelength laser weapons were also studied. MIRACL and ALL have 
already demonstrated the effectiveness of laser weapons, but thermal blooming in 
stagnant air and adverse weather conditions limit atmospheric propagation of the laser 
beam at the wavelengths used. The FEL's ability to select a particular wavelength can 
significantly reduce thermal blooming in maritime conditions. The tunable FEL 
mechanism allows changes in wavelength without significant redesign. 
It is shown that MW FEL could produce significant damage, and the required 
power decreases as missile speed increases over Mach 1. As a result of analysis in this 
thesis, it is proposed that the FEL's ultra-short pulse may reduce the amount of energy 
required to damage a missile. If less energy is necessary for damage, the chance of 
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thermal blooming may be reduced. A combination of wavelength selection and ultra-
short pulse effect may significantly reduce the thermal blooming problem, reduce the size 
of the PEL weapon, decrease the dwell time, or increase the probability of kill. 
The PEL appears to be the best laser weapon choice at this time, but since PEL 
technology is relatively new, an PEL capable of delivering the required power is still 
years away. To aid in the furthering PEL science and to help develop an PEL the 
performance ofTJNAP PEL is investigated. The simulations performed for and 
described in this thesis describe the expected performance of the TJNAF PEL for many 
values of electron pulse length, peak current and cavity desynchronism. These 
simulations are used to explain recent experimental observations of the TJNAP PEL. 
In conclusion, it is recommended that ultra-short pulse effects on missile radome 
materials be further investigated experimentally and theoretically. This investigation can 
be done with existing lasers such as the TJNAF PEL using a small target cross-section at 
a relatively low cost. The necessary power density of 10 kW/cm2 can be achieved over a 
1 mm2 spot with a 100 W PEL. 
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